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amerIcas
race to the toP: brazIl’s racIal 
Quotas for hIgher educatIon
In a groundbreaking decision, the 
Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil, 
Brazil’s highest court, unanimously ruled 
that the race quotas used in public uni-
versities are constitutional. The Tribunal 
issued its decision in April following a 
hotly contested debate that challenged 
the Brazilian ideal of “racial democracy.” 
With this ruling, Brazilian lawmakers have 
ushered in affirmative action laws aimed 
at combating discrimination and educating 
the historically marginalized Afro-Brazilian 
population. Proponents view this expansive 
move as the foundation for the possibility 
to broaden opportunities for minorities 
in Brazil.
The ruling arose from Ação do DEM 
vs. cotas da UNB e no Brasil (Action of 
Brazil’s Democratic Party v. Quotas of the 
UNB and in Brazil), the case brought by 
Democratas (Brazil’s Democratic Party 
(DEM)) against the Universidade de 
Brasilia (University of Brasilia (UNB)), 
which reserves twenty percent of its enroll-
ment spots for Afro-Brazilian, mixed-race, 
and indigenous students. The DEM argued 
that the policy was unconstitutional under 
Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution, 
which protects equality for all citizens 
regardless of race. The Tribunal rejected 
DEM’s claim, finding the quotas to be the 
best method to remedy racial inequalities 
that were never confronted after the aboli-
tion of slavery in 1888. The Tribunal held 
that racial quotas are the best transitory 
option to close the inequality gap in higher 
education. This gap is a major issue, as 
a majority of Afro-Brazilians continue 
to live in favelas and earn a fraction of 
the salaries enjoyed by the predominately 
Caucasian upper class.
On August 29, 2012, President Dilma 
Rouseff signed the Lei de Cotas (Law of 
Social Quotas). This law gives all federal 
universities four years to ensure that half 
of their incoming class comes from public 
schools. The spots reserved for marginal-
ized students will be in accordance to 
the percentage of the minority population 
in the state where each public university 
is located.
Proponents of the university policy hail 
the legal victory as one of the many steps 
needed to ensure that the marginalized 
populations, particularly Afro-Brazilians, 
gain access to adequate education and 
advanced job placement. Afro-Brazilians 
constitute around seventy percent of those 
that live below the poverty line and only 
2.2% have access to higher education. Much 
of the Afro-Brazilian population remains in 
the lower echelons of the socio-economic 
sectors of the country and receive poor 
education in public primary schools.
Opponents of racial quotas view the 
policy as a racial remedy for a socio- 
economic issue. Critics believe that cat-
egorizing the population by race will 
create a fractionalization of Brazilians 
along racial lines and could result in offi-
cializing racial discrimination. Some see 
the quotas as reverse racism that directly 
violates the Brazilian Constitution by 
favoring Afro-Brazilian students in the 
highly competitive selection process for 
public universities, while others view the 
racial quotas as an imported solution from 
the United States that is incompatible with 
Brazilian race relations. These opponents 
maintain a staunch ideal of “racial democ-
racy,” or the idea that Brazil’s racial classes 
were never clearly defined.
With the ruling of the Supreme Tribunal 
of Brazil and the subsequent Law of Social 
Quotas, Brazil has taken fundamental steps 
to adhere to its obligations under the 1960 
United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Convention against Discrimination in 
Education (Convention). Brazil’s policy 
is in accordance with Article 1, Sections 
(a) and (b) of the Convention, which 
call on States to eliminate educational 
discrimination that deprives citizens 
of access to higher education. By imple-
menting a national policy that promotes 
more equality in educational opportunities, 
Brazil has pursued an effective method of 
reform that is recommended in Article 4 of 
the Convention.
In accordance with its obligations under 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), Brazil has a 
responsibility to secure the advancement of 
a racial group that may require protection 
to ensure a fundamental human right. The 
CERD protects Brazil’s reforms because 
once the intended goals are achieved, they 
will not favor Afro-Brazilians as critics of 
the policy suggest. These measures can 
also be incorporated in social, educational 
and economic fields so that all marginal-
ized populations can enjoy equal access to 
a fundamental human right.
Race will not be the primary factor in 
determining access to higher education 
but rather a factor taken into consider-
ation, which complies with Article 13, 
Section 2(c) of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Brazil’s policy enables univer-
sities to serve the most vulnerable groups 
without discrimination. Rather than main-
taining a status quo that harmed a massive 
segment of its population, Brazil’s policy 
provides widespread access to the human 
right of education, which is required under 
the Covenant.
These efforts to expand higher education 
for marginalized Brazilians coincide with 
Brazil’s international obligations. The race 
quota policy legitimately protects human 
rights afforded to all citizens, and will 
be crucial in ensuring Brazil’s continued 
growth as a global power.
beg theIr Pardon: fuJImorI’s 
PossIble Pardon
Former Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori’s 25-year prison sentence for 
severe human rights violations may be 
coming to a premature end as current 
President Ollanta Humala contemplates 
granting the Fujimori family’s petition 
for a humanitarian pardon on behalf of the 
ex-president due to his health status.
During his time in office from 1990 
to 2000, Fujimori was lauded by some 
for his economic reforms and anti-ter-
rorist stance that eventually crippled the 
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“Shining Path,” a domestic terrorist orga-
nization. However, the Fujimori adminis-
tration was also notorious for corruption, 
bribery, and human rights violations that 
ultimately led to the President’s imprison-
ment in 2009. The Peruvian population is 
divided between those who remember the 
former leader as moving the economy for-
ward and eradicating domestic terrorism, 
and those who remember his authoritative 
rule that led to a self-imposed coup d’état, 
kidnapping, murders, and other human 
rights violations. On October 10, 2012, 
Fujimori’s family formally requested a 
humanitarian pardon to President Ollanta 
Humala. The family cited tongue cancer 
and other health issues as a humanitarian 
justification for his release. The Peruvian 
Constitution grants the President the power 
to pardon and to reduce a prison sentence 
if the prisoner has a terminal illness. A 
panel of medical examiners assesses the 
prisoner and informs the president of its 
recommendation, but the president makes 
the final decision.
Despite this constitutional power, many 
Peruvian politicians have pointed to Law 
26478 as an argument against the pardon. 
This law denies pardon of anyone found 
guilty of aggravated kidnapping, a crime 
for which Fujimori was convicted. Other 
politicians have remained open to the 
possibility of a pardon if doctors, after 
their thorough investigation, confirm that 
Fujimori’s illness is terminal. A recent 
poll has shown that seventy percent of 
the Peruvian public supports a move to 
house arrest or a pardon for the former 
president. While some senators and other 
allies of Fujimori continue to advocate 
for his release on medical grounds, Dr. 
Juan Postigo of the Instituto Nacional 
de Enfermedades Neoplásicas (National 
Cancer Institute) recently issued a state-
ment declaring that Fujimori’s treatments 
have been ongoing for twelve years and he 
remains in stable condition.
The Peruvian Constitution acknowl-
edges that a pardon must comply with the 
international treaties that Peru has ratified. 
Human Rights Watch has pointed out that 
Peru’s duty to prosecute violators of human 
rights cannot be undermined by amnesties, 
pardons, and other domestic provisions 
that grant immunity for these crimes.
Peru has ratified the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which is 
dedicated to protecting the rights of all 
citizens in the Western Hemisphere and 
is crucial in establishing the framework 
created domestically to determine the vio-
lations for which President Fujimori was 
convicted. The UN Human Rights Council, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), and other international bodies of 
which Peru is a member have expressly con-
demned pardons for those who committed 
grave human rights violations. In Gutiérrez-
Soler v. Colombia (2005), the IACtHR 
declared that “the State shall refrain from 
resorting to amnesty, pardon, and statute of 
limitations, and from enacting provisions to 
exclude liability, as well as measures aimed 
at preventing criminal prosecution or at void-
ing the effects of a conviction.” Similarly, in 
the Barrios Altos case of 2001, the Court 
overturned Peru’s amnesty laws protecting 
all civilians and members of the State’s 
security forces who had been “accused, 
investigated, prosecuted or convicted, or 
who were carrying out prison sentences, for 
human rights violations” associated with the 
Barrios Altos massacre.
If the medical examiners determine that 
Fujimori’s cancer is terminal, President 
Humala faces the difficult task of reconcil-
ing the powers given to him by the Peruvian 
Constitution to pardon a criminal due to 
terminal illness with the international legal 
restrictions that prohibit a pardon for viola-
tors of human rights in nearly all instances. 
Reducing the prison sentence for a violator 
of human rights for reasons outside of the 
“humanitarian” sphere would have deep 
implications for the relationship between 
Peru and the Inter-American Court, whose 
decisions are binding on the country. For 
now, the decision rests solely with President 
Humala and while some remain optimistic 
of a pardon, the domestic and interna-
tional legal parameters are leaning toward 
President Alberto Fujimori completing his 
prison sentence.
Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
u.s. voter suPPressIon may 
threaten InternatIonally 
Protected rIght to vote
The right to participate in the political 
process of government and have one’s voice 
heard is fundamental to the authenticity of 
any democracy. The U.S. Constitution pro-
hibits voting discrimination based on race, 
sex, and age in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and 
Twenty-sixth Amendments, respectively, to 
guarantee equal protection of the right to 
vote. However, the U.S. Constitution does 
not enumerate an affirmative right to vote. 
Nonetheless, several international treaties 
protect the universality of the right to vote 
and prevent voter disenfranchisement of 
minorities. The United States is a signa-
tory to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, both of which 
protect the right to universal and equal suf-
frage, enumerated in Article Twenty-One, 
Article Twenty-Five, and Article Five of the 
documents, respectively.
Historically, U.S. laws and policies dis-
enfranchised groups for the purpose of 
voter suppression. African Americans and 
other racial minorities, women, and con-
victed felons have struggled to realize their 
right to vote. In the Jim Crow era, literacy 
and poll tax laws discriminated against 
African Americans. Poll tax laws required 
citizens to pay a fee to participate in the 
election, which disenfranchised African 
Americans and poor white farmers in the 
South.
With the passage of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (VRA), most voting qualifica-
tions beyond citizenship were eliminated, 
including literacy tests and poll taxes that 
created barriers for African Americans to 
cast their ballot. The VRA guarantees that 
no person shall be denied the right to vote 
based on race or color. In 1975, the VRA 
expanded protections to other minorities 
that face discrimination based on ethnic-
ity or national origin. In Section Five of 
the VRA, certain jurisdictions with seg-
regationist histories are required to obtain 
preclearance from the U.S. Department of 
Justice for any changes to election laws, 
ensuring that minorities are not disenfran-
chised by discriminatory state and local laws.
Despite the aforementioned protec-
tions, there is a current resurgence of voter 
suppression in U.S. laws. Since 2008, a 
number of states have passed restrictive 
voting laws that will suppress the voter 
turnout of minorities. Measures to restrict 
votes include the following: requiring 
government-issued photo identification, 
reducing voting hours, placing restrictions 
on early or absentee voting, limiting voter 
registration drives, and gerrymandering 
districts. In 2011 alone, at least thirty-four 
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states introduced legislation that would 
create new voter identification require-
ments or strengthen existing requirements. 
Seventeen legislatures introduced strict 
photo identification bills, eleven of which 
became state laws. Jurisdictions not speci-
fied under the VRA successfully passed 
these laws without being blocked by the 
U.S. Department of Justice, regardless 
of their equally discriminatory effect on 
minority voters. Sixteen states have also 
either adopted or are currently pursuing 
citizenship-based purges of their voter rolls, 
which may disenfranchise eligible Latino 
voters. As the 2012 elections approached, 
many courts reviewed challenges to these 
laws to determine whether there was enough 
time to ensure access to newly required 
forms of identification before Election Day, 
or whether the implementation of the laws 
should be delayed until 2013.
By creating hurdles to the right to vote 
through inaccessibility and unaffordability, 
the voter ID laws will likely disproportion-
ately impact African Americans, Latinos, 
and other minorities; seniors; working 
low-income persons; the disabled; and 
students. Attorney General Eric Holder 
compared Voter ID laws to a poll tax, 
imposing barriers for the already disadvan-
taged. According to the Brennan Center for 
Justice at the New York University School 
of Law, approximately eleven percent of 
adult citizens—more than twenty-one mil-
lion people—lack a valid, government-
issued identification as required by some 
Voter ID laws. Twenty-five percent of 
African Americans do not possess a valid 
photo ID as well as nineteen percent of 
Latinos, compared to only eight percent 
of Whites. The new requirements make it 
difficult for eligible voters to exercise their 
human and constitutional right by demand-
ing documents, such as birth certificates 
that people do not have, or requiring trips 
to departments of motor vehicles that are 
nearly impossible for some.
Under the U.S. government’s interna-
tional responsibilities to human rights, 
the government is obligated to continue to 
investigate and prevent any laws that will 
discriminate against minorities regardless 
of whether a jurisdiction is subject to 
Section Five of the VRA. In accordance 
with the U.S. Constitution, the govern-
ment is required to implement protec-
tive measures for minority voters to pre-
vent discrimination. The right to vote is 
beyond partisanship; it is fundamental to 
the survival of a democracy that equally 
protects all eligible voters’ rights.
IndIgenous communIty  
challenges educatIonal  
dIsParItIes In guerrero
Vast disparities in access to education 
persist across Mexico, impeding the full 
realization of every child’s right to qual-
ity education guaranteed by the Mexican 
Constitution and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). Indigenous 
peoples are among the most disadvan-
taged and their rights are systematically 
violated. Consequently, indigenous chil-
dren are often excluded from the Mexican 
education system or are unable to access 
quality education. Indigenous communi-
ties generally live in difficult-to-reach 
rural areas, which ultimately affects their 
access to education and other basic ser-
vices. According to the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), twenty-six 
percent of indigenous people aged fifteen 
or older are illiterate, compared to the 
national average of nearly seven percent.
Specifically, members of the Me’phaa 
Indigenous Community of Buena Vista 
in the state of Guerrero experience severe 
impediments to realizing their right to 
education. According to the Tlachinollan 
Center for Human Rights of the Montaña 
(Tlachinollan), a leading human rights 
organization in Mexico, the illiteracy rate 
of the indigenous population in Guerrero 
is forty-one percent, even higher than 
the national average for indigenous com-
munities. Furthermore, estimates from 
Tlachinollan indicate that the average 
years of completed schooling among 
Community members fifteen and older 
is less than four years, compared to the 
national average of nearly nine years. 
Children of the Buena Vista Community 
between the ages of three and six years 
old must walk more than six kilometers 
per day in rugged terrain to a neighboring 
community to attend preschool. Over the 
past ten years, the Buena Vista Community 
has submitted multiple requests to the 
Ministry of Education of Guerrero for the 
development of a preschool center in their 
own community, but the government has 
repeatedly ignored these requests.
Article 3 of the Mexican Constitution 
guarantees individuals basic compul-
sory education consisting of preschool, 
primary, and secondary education through 
ninth grade. Furthermore, Mexico is a 
State Party to the CRC, which provides 
for the right to education in Articles 28 
and 29. Under its international human 
rights obligations, the State is responsible 
for guaranteeing all children free, quality 
primary education. Additionally, the State 
is required to ensure minorities the right to 
engage in their own educational practices 
as well as to adopt measures to protect the 
education of marginalized and minority 
groups. Accordingly, in indigenous com-
munities such as Buena Vista, the govern-
ment is obligated to take additional steps 
to ensure accessibility to quality education.
Under Mexican law, an aggrieved per-
son may initiate a legal process known as 
a juicio de amparo if individual guarantees 
provided in the Mexican Constitution have 
been violated. To file a writ of amparo, 
the alleged injured party must demon-
strate that a public official is responsible 
for the injury, the injury infringes upon a 
constitutional right, and the injury is not 
irreparable. In 2011, the Mexican govern-
ment enacted constitutional reforms to the 
amparo system expanding protection to 
rights not only afforded in the Constitution 
but also those enshrined in international 
human rights treaties to which Mexico is 
a State Party. Thus, the Mexican govern-
ment’s domestication of international law 
further enforces its responsibility to prevent, 
investigate, punish, and remedy any human 
rights violation. To demand their constitu-
tional right to education, members of the 
Buena Vista Community recently filed a 
writ of amparo based on the omissions of 
the educational authorities of Guerrero. The 
amparo addresses the key issues of non-
discrimination and physical accessibility for 
the members of the community.
Despite recommendations from the 
United Nations, civil society organiza-
tions, and requests from the local com-
munity, the State is consistently falling 
short of its citizen’s educational needs, par-
ticularly those located in the mountainous 
rural region of Guerrero. During his coun-
try visit to Mexico in 2010, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Education, Vernor Muñoz, 
found that “exclusion from opportunities 
of education in Mexico has a very spe-
cific group of victims, a situation which 
can be summed up in a single sentence: 
poor people receive poor education.” The 
government’s violation of the right to edu-
cation in poor and marginalized communi-
ties further exacerbates existing disparities 
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faced by the communities and hampers 
necessary development. The amparo law-
suit will challenge the recent constitutional 
reforms in protecting marginalized com-
munities’ access to social rights that have 
been systematically violated. Under its 
Constitution, the Mexican government is 
responsible for ensuring that indigenous 
communities have equal access to education 
compared with the rest of the population and 
for reducing the educational gap prevalent 
throughout the country.
Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
asIa and oceanIa
cotton PIckIng In uzbekIstan:  
a chIld labor Industry
Every September, state-run institutions 
in Uzbekistan lock their doors and dis-
play the words Hamma pahtada, Uzbek 
for “Everybody’s gone cotton-picking.” As 
the world’s third-largest exporter of raw 
cotton, Uzbekistan’s cotton exports gen-
erate $1 billion in annual revenue. From 
September to November, the entire country 
is immersed in what has been described as 
“cotton hysteria.” The harvesting process, 
however, institutionalizes a tradition of 
forced child labor. The Uzbek government 
has not only failed to comply with the 
minimum standards of international law, it 
has also continued to promote child labor 
to ensure that rising harvesting quotas are 
met. As a member of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), the government 
of Uzbekistan is legally obliged to bring 
harvesting practices in line with interna-
tional standards and could strengthen its 
compliance with international child labor 
laws by allowing the ILO and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to 
monitor future harvests.
During harvest season, rural schools 
are closed and students are sent directly 
to the fields, where they are forced to 
work thirteen-hour days. Harvesting under 
police guard, children as young as nine 
are forced to collect thirty to fifty pounds 
of cotton a day. Thousands of children 
between the ages of fifteen and eigh-
teen are loaded onto buses and taken to 
the fields, where their teachers are held 
personally responsible for ensuring that 
quotas are met. Students who refuse to 
participate are beaten or expelled; teach-
ers who refuse to comply are fired. Young 
adults enrolling in Uzbek universities 
are required to sign pledges promising 
to participate in the harvest. Each year, 
the Uzbek government denies the ILO’s 
requests to monitor the harvest, and offi-
cials in the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s 
Office have rejected complaints filed by 
human rights organizations.
As a member of the ILO since July 13, 
1992, Uzbekistan is required by Article 
19 of the ILO Constitution to comply 
with annual reports and recommendations. 
In 2009, the ILO requested information 
about labor policies and measures that 
have been taken to implement Uzbekistan’s 
legal obligations via international conven-
tions. A year later, the ILO’s Committee 
on Application of Standards requested to 
have an ILO supervisory board monitor the 
harvest. Uzbekistan has not complied with 
either request.
In addition to an obligation to comply 
with general ILO requests, Uzbekistan has 
also availed itself to the Minimum Age 
Convention (C183) and the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour Convention (C182). C183 
requires the minimum employment age 
to be higher than the age of completion 
of compulsory schooling but no less than 
fifteen years. Children as young as nine are 
required to participate in the cotton harvest 
in Uzbekistan. Further, the convention sets 
the minimum age for any employment that 
poses a risk to health or safety at eighteen 
years, and children between the ages of 
thirteen and fifteen may only be permit-
ted to obtain employment that does not 
negatively affect their attendance at school. 
By closing rural schools and requiring 
children to harvest cotton, Uzbekistan is 
failing to comply with these provisions. 
C182 expressly prohibits any form of 
forced or compulsory labor for children 
under the age of eighteen. Every Member 
State is bound, as a matter of top priority, 
to implement programs to eliminate the 
worst forms of child labor. Uzbekistan has 
failed to comply with its obligations by 
requiring children between the ages of nine 
and seventeen to participate in the harvest.
The Uzbek government is also bound 
by the recommendations of UNICEF and 
its commitments to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC). Uzbekistan 
acceded to the CRC on June 29, 1994, 
thereby agreeing that no governing body 
would act in a way contrary to the best 
interests of children. States Parties are 
specifically obliged to protect children 
from economic exploitation and hazardous 
work conditions. Uzbekistan has failed to 
uphold these standards by forcing chil-
dren to work in dangerous conditions. 
According to the annual Human Rights 
Watch report, children working during the 
harvest are more susceptible to illness due 
to unsanitary working conditions, exhaus-
tion, hunger, and the heat.
Uzbekistan is legally obligated to bring 
its harvesting policies in line with interna-
tional standards dictated by the ILO and 
UNICEF. To ensure that harvesting policies 
are in compliance with international law, the 
Uzbek government must grant the ILO and 
UNICEF access to monitor future harvests. 
Until Uzbekistan begins to comply with its 
international obligations, Uzbek children 
will continue to be deprived of education, 
freedom, and childhood.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
chInese drug detentIons  
facIlItIes receIve crItIcIsm 
desPIte reform efforts
Despite internal reforms in drug treat-
ment facilities in the most drug-impacted 
regions of China, human rights groups 
continue to highlight complaints by detain-
ees that facilities contravene international 
agreements and Chinese law by subjecting 
detainees to inhumane treatment and limit-
ing access to judicial process. Until 2008, 
drug rehabilitation in China occurred in 
detention facilities called re-education 
through labor (RTL) centers. RTL centers, 
though required to administer medical 
treatment for drug dependency, were fre-
quently criticized by watchdog groups for 
subjecting detainees to inhumane condi-
tions including sexual abuse and forced 
labor. In 2008, the Anti-Drug Law took 
effect. The new law includes provisions 
that address criticisms of the previous 
system “in accordance with the human-
centered principle,” while defining addicts 
as patients and victims and guaranteeing 
drug treatment. Multiple sources claim 
that so far, the law has not had the desired 
impact. Human Rights Watch issued a 
report in 2008 citing numerous detainees 
who criticized the new law, noting that it 
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expands police power, increases minimum 
sentencing to two years, and provides 
no mechanisms for protecting the human 
rights it claims to defend.
According to reports from media 
outlets and human rights organizations, 
compulsory drug detention centers con-
tinue to force detainees to work, deny 
access to medical care, and provide no 
access to judicial process. These condi-
tions would put the government in breach 
of both domestic and international law. 
The Chinese constitution guarantees the 
right to medical care for the ill (Article 
45), requires oversight for arrests (Article 
37), and guarantees public trial with the 
opportunity for defense (Article 125). 
The new Anti-Drug Law stipulates that 
drug users sent to compulsory treatment 
facilities must be detained in accordance 
with the constitution (Article 50, Anti-
Drug Law). The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), ratified by China in 2001, pro-
tects safe working conditions (Article 7) 
and the right to physical and mental health, 
including treatment of disease (Article 12). 
The United Nations Economic and Social 
Council elaborated on these articles, obli-
gating States Parties to recognize the right 
to health of all people, including prison-
ers and detainees. States are bound to 
make acceptable health care accessible 
to all, “especially the most vulnerable or 
marginalized.”
The Anti-Drug Law prohibits unpaid 
forced labor and physical abuse in Articles 
43 and 69, yet Human Rights Watch reports 
that violations continue, perpetuated by the 
severe lack of oversight. The report cites 
former detainees, who reported they were 
forced to work eighteen-hour days and 
were subjected to electrocution, beatings, 
and other inhumane and degrading treat-
ment. The New York Times reported the 
story of one inmate, who said that life in 
these compulsory rehabilitation centers “is 
an unremitting gauntlet of physical abuse 
and forced labor without any drug treat-
ment.” The inmate’s comments indicate 
the most striking of the alleged violations: 
Though the new measures are done under 
the guise of rehabilitation, neither medi-
cal nor therapeutic rehabilitation actually 
occur in many of the centers.
Though medical and therapeutic care 
is the purported intent of these facilities, 
many reportedly operate without sufficient 
medical staff and supplies. Because of 
this, many users in detention facilities face 
withdrawal without the help of medication. 
This leads to relapse within the clinics, 
where unsterile conditions, specifically 
the sharing of used needles, exacerbate the 
already staggering problem of HIV/AIDS 
within the detention centers. Many centers, 
however, provide no medical care to per-
sons with HIV/AIDS and often do not even 
inform inmates when they test positive. 
Access to antiretroviral drugs is routinely 
denied, even if the detainee was using the 
medication prior to incarceration. These 
policies suggest a conflict with China’s obli-
gations under Article 12 of the ICESCR, 
which requires respect for citizens’ rights to 
mental and physical health, as well as “[t]he 
creation of conditions which would assure 
to all medical service and medical attention 
in the event of sickness.”
Despite efforts at reform, the Chinese 
government continues to receive criticism 
for its handling of inmates. In October 
2011, after several reported deaths in these 
centers, the Chinese government issued 
a regulation that affirmed the illegality 
of forced labor and restricted the condi-
tions under which detainees could work. 
However, a May 2012 study by Human 
Rights Watch found that the regulation did 
not have the necessary impact on inmates. 
Human rights observers continue to call 
for the closure of compulsory drug rehabil-
itation centers in favor of a system where 
human rights abuses are vigilantly pre-
vented. Such an effort would give China 
an opportunity to demonstrate its com-
mitment to the ICESCR. Instead, many 
reforms continue to create systems where 
safeguards afforded by both domestic and 
international law are absent.
agrIcultural reform In north 
korea: the uncertaIn ProsPect  
of economIc growth and ImProved 
access to food
Though news outlets recently brought 
attention to a North Korean policy shift in 
favor of agricultural reform, human rights 
groups have since criticized the nation’s 
leadership for the persistence of state-run 
economic policies that function at the 
expense of the welfare of its citizens. Such 
criticisms of economic management in 
North Korea draw attention to the large 
number of citizens who live in deep pov-
erty and lack food security. Estimates, 
though varying, suggest that deaths from 
starvation or malnutrition in the late 1990s 
numbered between 900,000 and 3.4 mil-
lion people. The World Food Programme 
categorizes roughly 7.2 million, or thirty-
seven percent of the total population, as 
chronically poor. Severe weather and fam-
ine exacerbate the problems of malnutri-
tion and starvation, while insufficient pay 
for farmers raises concerns that a lack 
of motivation prohibits production and 
adds to the State’s trouble with generating 
adequate food.
Following the death of Supreme Leader 
Kim Jong-Il in 2011, and the ascent of 
Kim Jong-Un, some saw an opportunity 
for economic development. The Daily NK, 
a South Korea-based pro-democracy news-
paper that covers North Korea, reported 
that on June 28, 2012, Kim Jong-Un 
announced an agricultural-reform strategy, 
dubbed the 6.28 Policy, which has since 
gone into effect in 3 out of 144 counties. 
In the rest of the country, which is under 
the existing Public Distribution System, 
the government expropriates all output for 
redistribution. The 6.28 Policy, however, 
allows farmers who meet their quotas keep 
a higher percentage of their yield and bring 
that yield to market. The government’s 
goal is to motivate farmers to produce 
more without abandoning a state-centered 
agricultural system. Such reforms could, in 
theory, create a boon to the North Korean 
public at large as increasing food produc-
tion and allowing farmers to sell some 
crops on the open market could improve 
overall access to food.
The agriculture reforms are relevant to 
North Korea’s adherence to its treaty obli-
gations under the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which obligates states to rec-
ognize the right to free pursuit of eco-
nomic development (Article 1) and pro-
vide working conditions that include fair 
pay and allow for a decent living standard. 
Historically, regardless of North Korea’s 
ratification of the treaty, farmers have been 
forced to sell all crops to the state at a low 
price, after which the government distrib-
utes the crops.
The effect on the food markets also 
implicates both domestic and international 
obligations. The North Korean constitu-
tion provides that the state is responsible 
for affording workers with conditions for 
obtaining food. Article 25 of North Korea’s 
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constitution asserts the need to continually 
promote and improve material wealth in 
an effort to promote well-being. Under the 
ICESCR, Article 11 obligates States Parties 
to recognize rights to standards of living, 
particularly protection of the right to be 
free from hunger. However, despite these 
legal frameworks, conditions of starvation 
and malnutrition continue to burden North 
Koreans. Further, chronically low levels of 
production are exacerbated by economic 
policies, including low compensation for 
farmers and over-production of land. The 
situation has not gone unnoticed. In a 2010 
Resolution, the UN General Assembly 
expressed its concerns that violations of 
economic, social, and cultural rights have 
led to “severe malnutrition.” The follow-
ing year, the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) reaffirmed this concern, par-
ticularly vis-à-vis other national spending 
priorities, specifically the government’s 
prioritizing of military capabilities over 
the needs of its citizens. Of the gross 
national income, estimated at $25 billion, 
up to a third goes to military spending. 
The standing military consists of 1.2 mil-
lion people, making it one of the largest in 
the world. The UNHRC, the United States 
government, and human rights groups have 
criticized this military-first strategy for its 
misallocation of resources, and for leaving 
many citizens suffering.
Although the agricultural reforms do 
not indicate an interest by North Korea to 
change its priorities, they do present an 
opportunity to make some improvements 
toward guaranteeing the rights and pro-
tections under international and domestic 
laws. It is too early, however, to determine 
whether these prospects will pan out and, 
thus far, the application has been incon-
clusive. Outlets such as the Daily NK have 
criticized the program for maintaining 
state-run strategies that focus on targeted 
production and agricultural collectives. 
Detractors believe the 6.28 Policy will be 
largely ineffective at remedying issues of 
food security. Instead, experts urge repri-
oritization of North Korea’s expenditures, 
shifting focus away from military spend-
ing and instead investing in the needs of 
the people.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
IndonesIa’s aceh ProvInce adoPts 
sharIa law In conflIct wIth 
human rIghts standards
Under Sharia law in the predominantly 
Islamic province of Aceh in Indonesia, 
adulterers face death by stoning—pun-
ishment that is dictated by the Qu’ran. 
Starting in 1999—when Islamic law was 
implemented in the province—Aceh began 
punishing those who breached Sharia law 
by acts that include adultery, homosexu-
ality, gambling, consuming alcohol, and 
disobeying rules on attire. The nature of 
these punishments, which range from fines 
to the death penalty, conflict with both 
national and international human rights 
standards by impinging on the basic free-
doms of all humans and imposing cruel 
and inhumane treatment.
Aceh is the only province in Indonesia 
that fully employs Sharia, and, as such, 
Acehnese people are largely considered to 
be the most pious followers of Islam in the 
country. After Aceh’s numerous struggles to 
assert its Islamic identity through rebellions 
for independence, Aceh sought to unify and 
appease its citizens in 1999 by codifying 
Islamic law in the provincial legislation.
Sharia is the moral and religious code 
of Islam. It mandates the way all Muslims 
should live, as derived from the Qu’ran 
and the Prophet Muhammad. Aceh orig-
inally implemented Sharia law to pro-
mote egalitarianism, but, according to an 
International Crisis Group report, due to 
abuse and misuse of the laws, Aceh’s 
Islamic laws have encroached upon the 
Acehnese people’s human rights. In 2009, 
Aceh’s legislature passed a law penalizing 
adultery between two married individuals, 
which, according to a 2010 Human Rights 
Watch report, carried the most stringent 
punishment—death by stoning. Authorities 
punish unmarried individuals with up to 
100 lashes by cane for engaging privately 
with someone of the opposite sex. These 
Seclusion Laws allow the wiyatuyal hisbah 
(Aceh’s Islamic police) to seriously repri-
mand, through fines and corporal punish-
ment, any two unmarried people of the 
opposite sex found alone together, disre-
garding evidence of physical contact.
Although there is no clause in the text 
of the Sharia law that specifically outlaws 
gay marriage, the Aceh province has held 
harsh punishment for homosexuality. The 
BBC reported that the wiyatuyal hisbah 
forced a married lesbian couple to annul 
their marriage and separate, warning the 
couple that the punishment according to 
Islam was beheading.
Aceh’s Sharia law, as it stands, con-
flicts with the Indonesian Constitution, the 
1999 legislation on human rights enacted 
by the Indonesian government, and the 
United Nations Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The 
Indonesian Constitution holds greater 
weight than provincial laws, and therefore 
must be followed in Aceh before the local 
Sharia law. Article 28G of the Constitution 
states the right of every person to be pro-
tected from the “threat of fear to do or 
not do something that is a human right.” 
Furthermore, Aceh’s corporal punishment 
under Sharia law breaks with Article 28G 
of the Constitution, which states that every 
person has the right to be free from “inhu-
mane or degrading treatment” and Article 
28I, which propounds the freedom of reli-
gion and freedom from discriminatory 
treatment. The 1999 Indonesian human 
rights legislation established the right to 
security and the freedom from degrading 
punishment, the right to justice and due 
process, and the right to freedom of the 
individual and the right to freedom of reli-
gion. As a member of the United Nations, 
Indonesia ratified the CAT in 1998, which 
echoes the same freedoms enshrined in 
the Indonesian Constitution and the 1999 
human rights legislation, necessitating 
freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing punishment. Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International described the prac-
tices of caning and stoning as cruel pun-
ishment inconsistent with the principles of 
human rights established through interna-
tional law, and thus Indonesia’s laws.
The conservative local community in 
Aceh has made matters worse by pressur-
ing the wiyatuyal hisbah to apply its own 
punitive measures that extend beyond the 
scope of the Sharia law, even in cases of 
minor violations. Moreover, community 
members are often the first to discipline 
those who have violated Sharia law using 
their own form of condemnation.
The community represses any discus-
sion to repeal or amend the laws. Officials 
and citizens fear backlash from more con-
servative community members for speak-
ing out against the ill effects, abuse, and 
misuse of the laws. Aside from entirely 
repealing the law, if Aceh begins discussing 
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the law, it could move to a less literal inter-
pretation, as some countries have adopted, 
by limiting the wiyatuyal hisbah’s role 
and power, while simultaneously ensuring 
due process for those accused of violat-
ing Sharia law. Yet, without a discussion 
underway, the province of Aceh will con-
tinue to violate domestic and international 
standards of human rights.
the bangladeshI PractIce of chIld 
marrIage contInues to dIsregard 
domestIc law and un conventIons
Bangladesh outlawed child marriage in 
1929. Yet, according to the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), sixty-six per-
cent of girls in Bangladesh are married 
before they reach the age of eighteen. 
Bangladeshi communities that continue to 
practice the tradition of child marriage are 
not only violating Bangladeshi law, but are 
also violating United Nations conventions 
on Consent to Marriage and the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), to which Bangladesh 
has acceded, and the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), which 
Bangladesh has ratified. The practice of 
child marriage is rooted in social tradi-
tion and economic need, but it has adverse 
effects on the health and education of girls. 
According to a report by the International 
Center for Research on Women, child 
brides are prone to suffer domestic vio-
lence and abandon school, and as a result 
of early pregnancy are susceptible to health 
complications. When the Bangladesh gov-
ernment developed legislation that led 
to the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 
1929, it considered various socio-cultural 
factors—such as poverty and societal val-
ues—that drive parents to marry off their 
young daughters. The law criminalizes 
marriages when either party is a minor, 
classified as girls under eighteen and boys 
under twenty-one, and penalizes those 
who permit or aid such a marriage, includ-
ing parents, through a fine and up to one 
month's imprisonment.
Bangladesh’s laws on the issue are 
encompassed by its obligations, including 
CEDAW, which the State ratified in 1984 
and prohibits child marriage in Article 
16(2). In 1998, Bangladesh acceded to 
the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
which calls for the “full and free con-
sent” of both parties in all legally binding 
marriages in Article 1. Article 2 requires 
states to set a minimum age for marriage. 
However, Bangladesh reserved its right to 
apply Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention 
concerning the issue of child marriage “in 
accordance with the Personal Laws of dif-
ferent religious communities of the coun-
try.” Allowing personal laws of religious 
communities to supersede international 
law sustains the practice of child marriage 
in Bangladesh.
Adherence to these principles can be 
complicated in Bangladesh, where many 
villagers believe that marriage protects 
a girl’s chastity and is a divine com-
mand from God. As explained by Farah D. 
Chowdhury, a political science professor 
in Bangladesh, in a 2004 article in the 
International Journal of Social Welfare, 
all females are obligated to become wives 
and raise a family and the sooner they are 
married, the sooner the obligation is ful-
filled. Additionally, the marriage of young, 
submissive, and obedient girls maintains 
the status quo of a patriarchal society. The 
older an unmarried girl becomes, the more 
her family will be shamed in the com-
munity. Beyond the religious and cultural 
influences, there is an economic advantage 
to child marriage. Girls are often consid-
ered a burden to families because of their 
financial dependence. Once a girl has 
been married, her husband’s family must 
provide for her, thus liberating her parents 
of their financial duty. When a family 
is impoverished, there is consequently a 
greater desire to marry off daughters at a 
younger age. Further, the parents lessen 
the financial strain of their daughters’ 
dowry since the younger the girl’s age at 
marriage, the smaller the dowry can be.
Although young daughters’ families 
might benefit from the arranged mar-
riages, the effect on the child brides can 
be severe. Many young brides have not 
fully developed reproductively and are 
at great risk for maternal mortality and 
miscarriage. Marriage also limits a girl’s 
possibility of schooling or further educa-
tion. This is in direct violation of the right 
to education provided by Article 28 of the 
CRC. A young girl’s submissiveness and 
obedience also makes her more vulnerable 
to domestic violence and abuse in her hus-
band’s home.
Despite the many laws that child 
marriage in Bangladesh continues to 
violate, Bangladesh has done little to 
enforce the laws and protect children’s 
rights. Fortunately the government does 
plan to register all marriages and births, 
which would provide greater oversight. 
However, Bangladesh’s reservation to the 
Convention on Consent to Marriage indi-
cates the country is not ready to confront 
the differing practices based on religious 
communities. Embracing the whole of 
the convention both by dismissing the 
reservation and implementing procedures 
to enforce all obligations would broaden 
protection for the Bangladeshi people. 
Regardless of the existence of legislation 
to combat the tradition of child marriage 
in Bangladesh, insufficient enforcement of 
the laws will preserve the practice of child 
marriage to the detriment of young girls in 
the country.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
water scarcIty In central asIa 
may lead to conflIct
Water scarcity is a looming problem 
throughout the world, particularly affect-
ing developing nations such as the Central 
Asian states. Approximately 884 million 
people do not have access to safe drinking 
water. In Central Asia, obtaining an equi-
table division of the region’s major rivers, 
the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, is a dis-
puted issue that may lead to armed conflict. 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the countries 
that control the rivers, both have plans 
to build hydroelectric dams, which will 
give them substantial influence over water 
resources in the region to the potential det-
riment of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. With 
increasing water scarcity in Central Asia 
and the vacuum left by a lack of binding 
international law, the dam plans will make 
achieving the seventh UN Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG), ensuring wide-
spread access to clean water, and realizing 
the objective of UN Resolution 64/292 on 
the right to water, increasingly difficult and 
may send the region into armed conflict. 
The effects of such a conflict could be 
devastating, leading to the contravention 
of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).
Historically, the Central Asian states 
developed a standard for water and elec-
tricity exchange due to stringent Soviet 
resource-allocation policies. In 1992, after 
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the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly 
independent Central Asian states signed 
the Almaty Agreement, maintaining the 
Soviet allocation of water, which favored 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Under the 
agreement, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do 
not have enough water for their planned 
development activities and are desperately 
in need of the dam projects.
Because the right to water is not a 
self-standing right in international human 
rights law, dam projects by Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan would not necessarily be in 
direct contravention to binding interna-
tional obligations. The proposed dam proj-
ects will provide Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
with urgently needed power. Despite this, 
Uzbek and Kazakh leadership oppose the 
dam projects, arguing that the projects 
will disrupt water supplies in the two 
countries, negatively affecting their agri-
cultural exports and economies, and dam-
aging the environment. If Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan move forward with their dam 
projects, achieving the seventh MDG to 
halve the proportion of the population 
without sustainable access to safe drink-
ing water and basic sanitation by 2015 
will be nearly impossible. It will also 
challenge the goals set out in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 64/292, promising 
“to provide safe, clean, accessible and 
affordable drinking water and sanitation 
for all.” Though Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
both agreed to the MDGs and voted for the 
General Assembly resolution, these decla-
rations are not legally binding.
Despite the lack of binding interna-
tional guarantees for the right to water, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may reconsider 
moving forward with their dam projects 
because of the threat of war. Uzbekistan’s 
president, Islam Karimov, stated that the 
dam projects could lead to war because of 
water’s importance to Uzbekistan’s agri-
cultural exports, which make up a large 
percentage of the country’s foreign earn-
ings. Water conflicts, or “water wars,” 
occur when a country controls the water 
resources of another, water-scarce, country 
and uses water as leverage. Human rights 
laws guaranteeing the right to water are not 
strong enough to adequately deter coun-
tries that may consider engaging in water 
wars; however, the humanitarian effects 
of water wars may trigger international 
legal obligations. Women and children 
in Central Asia are particularly in danger 
from water scarcity issues because much 
of the agricultural work falls on them. 
They are often responsible for transporting 
water to the home; thus, with increased 
water scarcity they will be spending much 
more time and energy transporting water. 
Additionally, there is clear gender inequal-
ity regarding access to water, with rural 
women facing critical problems in this 
area. Despite the lack of binding interna-
tional law on the right to water, by instating 
policies that will exacerbate water scarcity 
and lead to war, the Central Asian states 
are ignoring Article 14 of CEDAW and 
Article 24 of the CRC, which specifically 
protect the rights of women and children 
and their access to water resources.
The countries of Central Asia are victims 
of a post-Soviet lack of a coordinated man-
agement system, but these actions could 
likely hamper the goals set out in human 
rights declarations. Without stronger human 
rights laws governing access to water, the 
region is highly susceptible to water wars, 
certain countries and minorities are dis-
proportionately affected, and water scarcity 
will get exponentially worse due to climate 
change and mismanagement of resources.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
euroPe
russIan olymPIc PreParatIon 
dIsPlaces nearby resIdents
Russia’s preparations for the 2014 
Winter Olympics in Sochi have elicited 
concern from nearby residents and human 
rights advocates that the rights of pri-
vate landowners are being compromised in 
preparation for the Games. While residents 
have actively protested and petitioned 
against appropriation of land for major 
Olympic infrastructure projects, a Human 
Rights Watch report from September 2012 
presented significant evidence that the 
Russian government continues to forc-
ibly expropriate private property without 
providing adequate compensation for dis-
placed residents. Furthermore, those who 
remain in Sochi contend that they live 
with fears that noise pollution and emis-
sions from the construction of a large-scale 
power plant being built near the residential 
area to strengthen infrastructure for the 
Olympic Games will threaten their health 
and create an unsafe living environment.
Russia’s complicated history of transi-
tioning from public to private land own-
ership has contributed to the confusion 
surrounding these expropriations. During 
the 1990s, the Russian government priva-
tized and distributed land following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. This distri-
bution process was often informal, and 
did not always include official ownership 
documents. Additionally, contradictions in 
land registries often resulted in multiple 
claims to a property. A Human Rights 
Watch report notes that, due to deed reg-
istration issues, many Russians living in 
Sochi could not prove ownership of their 
land and have consequently lost property 
without compensation.
Dmitry Chernyshenko, President of the 
Russian Olympics Organizing Committee, 
said that confusion over Soviet-era housing 
assignments has caused difficulty with the 
relocation of some citizens, but responded 
to criticism by stating that some relocated 
residents experienced significant improve-
ment in their housing. The government’s 
claims, however, are inconsistent with 
many reports from monitoring organiza-
tions, which have found that property valu-
ations do not take into account residents’ 
improvements and are less than tax assess-
ments. When residents refused to sign 
relocation agreements, a Human Rights 
Watch letter to the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) from December 2010 
found that authorities threatened to take 
property without consent and open bank 
accounts in residents’ names to deposit 
compensation money.
The Russian government’s expropria-
tions present possible conflict with the 
Russian Constitution, which bars depri-
vation of property unless it is through a 
court order and provides mutually agreed 
upon, equal, compensation. However, 
the Russian government passed a law in 
preparation for the Olympics permitting 
expropriation of property and allowing 
the government to decide what it will pay, 
if anything, to former private property 
owners. Because property values in Sochi 
skyrocketed following the announcement 
that it will host the Olympics, critics of the 
government have argued that the law was 
enacted to allow Russia to avoid paying the 
current full property values.
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Although the newly passed Olympic 
law may give Russia domestic justification 
for the expropriations, the country’s actions 
are still subject to its treaty obligations. 
Article 17 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) require protection 
from arbitrary interference in home and 
family lives. The ECHR is more explicit, 
providing in Article 1 of Protocol 1 that 
“[e]very natural or legal person is entitled 
to the peaceful enjoyment of his posses-
sions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest 
and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of 
international law.”
Outside of pursuing claims with the 
European Court of Human Rights and the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
residents and advocates could look to 
pressure from the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC). The IOC Charter states 
that it will “cooperate with the competent 
public or private organisations and authori-
ties in the endeavor to place sport at the 
service of humanity and thereby to pro-
mote peace.” The provision could provide 
an avenue—or at least a justification—for 
the IOC to exert pressure on Olympic 
countries to address human rights con-
cerns, including concerns of expropriation.
The recent history of the IOC, how-
ever, raises questions about the mandate’s 
strength. The Charter states that one of 
the goals of the IOC is to “promote a 
positive legacy from the host cities and 
host countries.” Both leading up to and 
following the Beijing Olympics, Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, 
among others, called attention to condi-
tions in China, including imprisonment of 
activists during the games. Furthermore, 
Brazil’s current demolition of the favelas 
(shantytowns) in Rio de Janeiro in prepara-
tion for the 2016 Olympics raises concerns 
over the IOC’s willingness to intervene in 
Sochi. By declining to involve itself in the 
actions of host countries, the IOC weak-
ens its ability to influence human rights 
issues. Without legal or IOC accountabil-
ity, countries have fewer impediments to 
enacting legislation even more detrimental 
than Russia’s Olympic law. The individuals 
would suffer while the world celebrates its 
shared humanity through sport.
as the euroPean economy 
struggles, natIonalIst PartIes grow
As the economic crisis in Europe deep-
ens, regional extremist right-wing politi-
cal parties, taboo after World War II, 
are becoming more common due to their 
policies promoting both nationalism and 
protectionism. As the movement expands 
beyond domestic politics and into the 
governing body of the Council of Europe 
(COE), it raises issues of negative treat-
ment for minority groups.
In June 2012, the Greek political 
party Golden Dawn won nine percent of 
Parliamentary seats with its slogan “So we 
can rid the land of filth.” A stark indica-
tion of the waning condemnation of such 
groups came on October 1, 2012, when the 
COE named one of the party’s parliamen-
tarians, Eleni Zaroulia, a member of the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on 
Equality and Non-Discrimination. There 
was an outcry from organizations such 
as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
against her membership. The ADL has 
complained of Golden Dawn’s well-known 
xenophobic views and discriminatory 
practices. Party members have denied the 
Holocaust and publically shunned immi-
grants and other migrants, particularly 
Jewish religious groups and persons from 
Pakistan, India, Albania, and African coun-
tries. The party has advocated limiting full 
political rights to only persons of Greek 
descent and identity.
The rise of Golden Dawn has been 
largely attributed to the economic situa-
tion in Greece. Nicolas Papakostadanous, 
a spokesperson for the Greek Consulate in 
New York, said, “This Golden Dawn is a 
backlash, a byproduct of very austere, very 
severe economic problems.” However, 
Golden Dawn is not alone; it is part of 
an emerging trend in Europe. Right-wing, 
nationalist parties have gained politi-
cal exposure in France, the Netherlands, 
Hungary, Norway, Finland, and Denmark.
Extreme-right political parties tend to 
merge welfare aspirations of the center left 
with conservative themes of protectionism 
and nationalism. Their ideology empha-
sizes that the government should provide 
services, but those services should only be 
available to native citizens. This has proved 
an attractive combination for Europeans, 
many of whom have lost faith in current 
political leaders and seek alternative eco-
nomic and political policies.
The rise of far-right elements has not 
gone unnoticed among human rights advo-
cates. The ADL has urged the Committee 
on Equality and Non-Discrimination to 
reconsider Golden Dawn’s membership. 
Alternatively, the ADL asked that Zaroulia 
be rebuked for any statements that pro-
mote what is often described as Golden 
Dawn’s “neo-Nazi” ideology and that she 
be prevented from taking any committee 
leadership roles. Additionally, on October 
16, 2012, the European Union of Jewish 
Students started a petition to remove Ms. 
Zaroulia from the Committee.
Although granting membership to an 
organization with a strong discrimina-
tory message appears to run counter to 
the goals of a committee seeking to pre-
vent discrimination, removing Golden 
Dawn from the committee would raise free 
speech issues. Curtailing Golden Dawn’s 
ability to express its viewpoints would 
create a highly charged atmosphere in 
which the issue of immigrant rights and 
the danger of extremist ideals would be 
lost. A less controversial choice would 
be to urge the COE and other European 
bodies to adopt broader, more effective, 
anti-discrimination policies to prevent the 
nationalist groups from gaining further 
power while their actions go unchecked.
European regional institutions imple-
mented two directives that have been car-
ried out in relation to discrimination. The 
first was created in 2004 and promotes 
the principle of equal treatment between 
people, irrespective of racial or national 
origin. The second, created in 2008, estab-
lishes a general framework for equal treat-
ment in employment settings. While these 
steps offer some anti-discriminatory pro-
tections to Europeans, the legal frame-
work is incomplete. The Commission 
has proposed a directive to complete the 
legal framework and prohibit all forms 
of discrimination and harassment beyond 
the workplace and provide an appropriate 
redress system for victims through the EU.
Golden Dawn’s participation in the 
COE’s Committee on Equality and Non-
Discrimination is, at the moment, a politi-
cal anomaly, but without adequate recourse 
for those who experience discriminatory 
action, membership of groups with similar 
ideologies could become the norm and 
pose significant risk for domestic pro-
tection of minority groups. Greece and 
other countries in which right-wing parties 
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are gaining political clout must also take 
responsibility for implementing appropri-
ate strategies to protect people who reside 
within their borders. It is only through 
cooperation between national governments 
and international governing bodies that 
minority groups can be protected from 
the negative treatment advocated by these 
right-wing organizations
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
mIddle east and north afrIca
ProtectIon of the amazIgh IdentIty 
In lIbya’s new constItutIon
Comprising ten percent of the Libyan 
population, the Berbers (who call them-
selves Amazigh, meaning “free man”) cel-
ebrate a cultural heritage that pre-dates 
Arab expansion by thousands of years. 
Though they do not consider themselves 
to be a unified nation, the Amazigh have 
developed a culture distinct from the Arab 
identity. Under the Qaddafi regime, the 
Amazigh faced constant cultural repression 
from policies intended to eliminate any 
non-Arab influence on society. After play-
ing a fundamental role in the overthrow of 
Qaddafi in November 2011, the Amazigh 
were not offered ministry positions within 
the National Transitional Council. In July 
2012, a few Amazigh were elected to serve 
in the Libyan General National Congress 
(GNC), but the government has yet to 
offer substantive rights to the Amazigh 
peoples specifically, and to Libyan minori-
ties generally. As the GNC begins to draft 
a new Libyan constitution, it is obligated, 
under the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), to provide com-
prehensive rights for all Libyan minorities, 
including the Amazigh.
The two hundred members of the GNC 
will attempt to eliminate the remnants 
of Qaddafi’s Libya as they draft a new 
constitution. The attack on the American 
Consulate in Benghazi and assassination 
of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens 
has highlighted the need for the rule of 
law and consolidation of Libya’s central 
authority, a demand expressed by Libyans 
themselves. In the face of nearly insur-
mountable odds and increasing violence, 
minority rights do not seem to be a priority 
for the GNC.
In order to undo the cultural repres-
sion perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime, 
the GNC must fulfill its international 
obligations by abandoning several arti-
cles of Libya’s 1969 constitution aimed 
at marginalizing distinct cultural groups. 
The Qaddafi regime declared, “[T]he 
Libyan people are part of the Arab nation. 
Their goal is total Arab unity.” Amazigh 
were expressly forbidden from practicing 
their historical customs, celebrating cul-
tural holidays, and bestowing non-Arabic 
names upon their children. The constitu-
tion also mandated that, “Arabic is the 
official [l]anguage [of Libya].” Qaddafi’s 
Revolutionary Council could officially 
approve other languages but even singing 
in the traditional Amazigh language of 
Tamazight was punishable by death.
The GNC is legally obligated to uphold 
the international treaties to which Libya 
is already a State Party, while considering 
using the existing international conven-
tions and declarations as a rubric for its 
own constitution. In 1968, Libya acceded 
to the CERD, and thereby agreed to amend, 
rescind, or nullify any laws that perpetuate 
discrimination. The GNC therefore has an 
obligation to abolish laws that discriminate 
against Amazigh culture and replace them 
with structural protection of cultural iden-
tity. UN General Assembly resolutions can 
also serve as models. While these resolu-
tions are not binding, they are a persuasive 
indication of international custom. For 
instance, Libya was among the 144 nations 
that voted for the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), which 
grants the right of indigenous groups to 
practice and revitalize their cultural tradi-
tions and customs. Libya can uphold the 
principles set forth in the Declaration by 
incorporating protections for minorities in 
its constitution. Further, Article 22 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) provides that the right to realize 
social and cultural rights is indispensable 
to free development of personality and cre-
ates a framework for protection of distinct 
social and cultural groups. A successful 
Libyan constitution could begin by recog-
nizing Tamazight as an official language, 
thereby making a statement of inclusion 
by incorporating Amazigh culture into the 
new Libyan national identity.
The new Libyan constitution does not 
only have the potential to be revolution-
ary for the Amazigh; it may also serve to 
protect the rights of all of Libya’s minor-
ity groups and will set a precedent for 
other countries in a similar transition after 
the Arab Spring. Libya could become a 
model for the successful integration of 
marginalized nations, while also serving 
as a springboard for further reform efforts. 
These possibilities demonstrate the impor-
tance of the GNC bringing the new Libyan 
constitution in line with the country’s pre-
existing international obligations.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
the ImPlIcatIons of lImIts on 
relIgIous freedom In Israel
Tension between Israel’s secular and 
ultra-Orthodox populations represents one 
of the most difficult issues facing Israeli 
society today. When Israel was established, 
the country’s founders made an agree-
ment, referred to as the “status quo agree-
ment,” with the political leaders of the 
ultra-Orthodox community. The agreement 
gives ultra-Orthodox leaders authority over 
religious matters, a widely inclusive topic, 
as Israel has no separation of church and 
state. It has led to deep-rooted tensions 
between Israel’s ultra-Orthodox citizens 
and the rest of the population, and has 
put the country at odds with human rights 
norms. Israel’s policies regarding religion 
and state demonstrate a divergence from 
several human rights norms, including 
freedom of religion, women’s rights, and 
minority rights. These rights are protected 
by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
and the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
The ultra-Orthodox leadership has 
authority over all personal status issues 
for Israeli Jews. This includes marriage, 
divorce, and religious conversion. The 
lack of civil marriage or divorce options 
in Israel forces all citizens to wed and 
divorce according to state-sanctioned 
religious authorities. Under this policy, 
many Israelis cannot get married in Israel, 
including anyone without an official reli-
gion, inter-faith couples, and same-sex 
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couples. Article 18 of the ICCPR defends 
“the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion.” Israel’s lack of civil marriage 
and divorce violates Israeli citizens’ right to 
freedom of religion. The ICCPR also pro-
tects people against coercion. Even though 
Israel has signed and ratified the ICCPR, 
and is thus legally bound by it, Israeli citi-
zens are not free to make their own choices 
regarding religion.
The status quo agreement has had far-
reaching effects on women’s rights in Israel as 
well. In recent years, public spaces through-
out the country have succumbed to ille-
gal, forced gender segregation, with women 
increasingly forced from the public sphere in 
the name of modesty. Article 7 of CEDAW 
asserts that states must safeguard women’s 
rights as strongly as men’s, obliging states to 
“eliminate discrimination against women in 
the … public life of the country.” Although 
Israel has ratified CEDAW, it is not uphold-
ing this Convention because it is not defend-
ing women’s rights against religious coer-
cion. Article 7 also stipulates that the burden 
to protect women’s rights lies on the State to 
“take all appropriate measures.” Appropriate 
measures include stifling religiously moti-
vated exclusion of women from the public 
sphere. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the for-
mer UN Special Rapporteur on violence 
against women, its causes and consequences, 
explained that States have a responsibility 
to protect women from religiously moti-
vated violence. There is no reason why the 
States’ responsibility should not carry over to 
defend all aspects of women’s rights outlined 
in CEDAW against religiously motivated 
violations. Israel’s status quo agreement can-
not be used as justification for ignoring the 
marginalization of women in society.
Israel’s practices also violate its obli-
gations under CERD. Israel’s minority 
groups have recently been hit with a wave 
of racism and discrimination, inspired and 
perpetuated by public figures and religious 
leaders. Racist incitement is a criminal 
offense in Israel, but there is a trend of 
community leaders using religious law to 
justify racial discrimination. Throughout 
the past year, several state-employed rabbis 
have repeatedly referred to Israel’s Arab 
citizens as “the enemy” and have preached 
that all Arabs have a violent nature. These 
rabbis have also urged Jews not to rent or 
sell apartments to Arabs and not to employ 
Arabs or shop from stores that do employ 
Arabs. Article 2 of CERD states that coun-
tries must “condemn racial discrimination 
and … pursue … a policy of eliminating 
racial discrimination in all its forms and 
promoting understanding among all races.” 
As a country that has ratified CERD, Israel 
is legally bound to denounce and eradicate 
all forms of racial discrimination, while 
taking freedom of speech into account. 
By allowing racial discrimination and rac-
ist incitement to continue, Israel is not 
upholding its duties outlined in the CERD.
These examples demonstrate the ten-
sions that exist between Israel’s status 
quo agreement and issues of religion and 
state. Through legal work in Israeli courts 
and advocacy in Israel’s parliament, sev-
eral Israeli human rights organizations 
are striving to bring change in the area of 
religion and state in Israel, and to push 
the government to uphold its international 
legal obligations. The Israeli government 
has a legal obligation to make the neces-
sary reforms to bring its policies into sync 
with the human rights treaties that the 
country has ratified.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, is a staff writer for the 
Human Rights Brief.
sub-saharan afrIca
new somalI constItutIon seeks to 
Protect IndIvIdual rIghts
After over two decades of transitional 
governance, Somalia’s National Constituent 
Assembly adopted a provisional constitu-
tion, with 96 percent approval, that would 
introduce sweeping individual protections 
to a country that has struggled to form 
a legitimate government. The constitution 
went into effect on August 20, 2012, fol-
lowing the expiration of the Transitional 
Federal Government and the appointment 
of a new parliament. The event marks a 
momentous occasion for Somalia, a country 
often described as a “failed state.” Although 
the document enshrines some fundamental 
human rights, other provisions raise legal 
conflicts that could limit the effectiveness 
of the constitution’s mandates to protect the 
rights of individuals.
To gauge popular support for the con-
stitution, Somalia originally planned to 
hold a national referendum, but logistical 
issues—partly attributable to the presence 
of the militant Islamic group al-Shabab—
thwarted the government’s democratic 
ambition. Instead, the current plan calls 
for the new parliament to vote on ratifica-
tion, leaving the democratic nature of the 
process unclear. The disjointed nature of 
Somalia’s varying array of autonomous 
semi-states has lead to a UN-sanctioned 
process where clan elders appoint the 
new parliament. This result—a product 
of Somalia’s fractured governmental and 
political system under which some regions 
have declared autonomy—further sepa-
rates the people from the constitution.
Although aspirations of open demo-
cratic governance will not be met at present, 
the constitution’s guarantees of rights will 
immediately become law. The Somali Bill 
of Rights provides the primary framework 
for individual rights and explicitly guaran-
tees the foundational concept of equality 
regardless of clan or religious affiliation—a 
shift that overcomes significant historical 
roadblocks to social equality. This guaran-
tee reflects a foundational basic universal 
human right established in Article 2 of both 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to 
which Somalia is a party.
Expanding from this central concept, 
the new constitution provides for progres-
sive protections of women and children’s 
rights in both social and political spheres. 
In matters related to health and personal 
security, the constitution bans the common 
local practice of female circumcision and 
provides for the right to an abortion when 
a woman’s life is at stake. Demonstrating 
progressive political policy, the Somali 
constitution also guarantees the right of 
women to hold elected office and stipu-
lates that women must hold thirty percent 
of seats in parliament. On children’s rights, 
the Somali provisional constitution guar-
antees the right to education through sec-
ondary school and places an explicit ban 
on the use of children in armed conflict.
Nevertheless, the constitution does fall 
short of significant international norms by 
stipulating a religious preference. It speci-
fies “no religion other than Islam can be 
propagated.” Further conflicting with the 
right to religious freedom—guaranteed by, 
among other documents, Article 18 of the 
ICCPR—the constitution sets forth that 
Sharia law forms the basis of the legal sys-
tem. Aside from possibly restricting reli-
gious freedom, this leaves a constitution 
based on Islam to govern both non-Muslims 
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and Muslims alike. The provision could 
further restrict the effect of the guarantees 
of individual rights for vulnerable popula-
tions, as it explicitly states that all laws not 
in accordance with the general principles 
of Sharia are invalid. Some Somalis have 
already objected to these rights on the 
grounds that they are not in accordance 
with Sharia. The primary objections relate 
to the previously discussed guarantees of 
thirty-percent female representation in par-
liament and the right to abortions in cases 
where the mother’s life is at risk. Similarly, 
opposition also exists to the ban on female 
circumcision, which is estimated to affect 
ninety-eight percent of Somali women.
Despite the possible conflicts, the provi-
sions represent an express step by Somalia 
toward confronting the lack of individual 
protections in the country and overcom-
ing the difficulties of the past—so much 
so that the constitution also establishes 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The language of the constitution and the 
effort to revisit the effect of past human 
rights abuses and violence, similar to the 
approach made famous in post-Apartheid 
South Africa, conceptualizes the inviola-
bility of the individual as a crucial element 
of the new government. To what extent jus-
tice and human rights are made accessible 
to the Somali people in practice, however, 
will hinge on whether and to what extent 
the new government is successful in imple-
menting these innovations.
nIgerIan resPonse to InsurrectIon 
raIses concern over torture and 
crImes agaInst humanIty
The Nigerian Islamic organization 
ama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-
Jihad, known as Boko Haram, and Nigerian 
security forces have engaged in a series 
of violent conflicts, culminating in a mili-
tary attack on October 8, 2012, that killed 
an estimated thirty civilians in Maiduguri. 
Earlier that day, a bombing killed a Nigerian 
lieutenant, eliciting the military attack that 
utilized troops and armored personnel car-
riers. Observing human rights organiza-
tions have raised concerns that the instant 
violence is only the most recent conflict in a 
long series of attacks that have claimed the 
lives of more than 2,800 people.
Boko Haram is a militant jihadist orga-
nization in Northern Nigeria that seeks 
to establish Nigeria as an Islamic state. 
In 2009, Boko Haram began an armed 
insurrection against the country using 
bombings and armed attacks. More than 
690 people in 2012 have so far fallen 
victim to attacks targeting non-fundamen-
talist Muslims, Christians, and government 
facilities. Nigerian security forces, retaliat-
ing against Boko Haram’s violent strikes, 
have launched their own counteroffen-
sives, culminating in allegations of human 
rights abuses and crimes against humanity 
by both sides in the conflict.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) and 
Amnesty International (AI) reported that 
Nigerian security forces utilize torture, 
inhumane treatment, and extra-judicial 
killings of civilians. These acts are in 
conflict with binding provisions of the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) and 
the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), as well as gen-
eral human rights principles encompassed 
in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), all of which Nigeria is 
party to without reservations.
The CAT bans the use of torture in 
all circumstances, specifically stating in 
Article 10 that “internal political instability 
or any other public emergency” cannot be 
used to justify torture. There are numerous 
reports of security forces removing sus-
pected Boko Haram members and subject-
ing them to torture at secret government 
facilities. Although Article 10 of the CAT 
requires that Nigeria investigate and pros-
ecute individuals accused of torture, the 
Nigerian government has denied both the 
existence of secret facilities and the torture 
of detainees. In addition, HRW reported 
that extra-judicial killings, including mass 
executions and execution of family mem-
bers, are numerous and have increased 
since 2009. The extrajudicial killing of 
suspected Boko Haram members would 
implicate the rights to due process and 
life found in UDHR Articles 3 and 10 and 
codified in ICCPR Articles 6 and 9.
The reported actions of both Nigerian 
security forces and Boko Haram also raise 
allegations of crimes against humanity. 
The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which Nigeria has ratified, 
codifies the substantive elements of crimes 
against humanity. Article 7 establishes 
that acts of murder, torture, rape, perse-
cution, and enforced disappearances are 
crimes against humanity when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
against civilian populations in furtherance 
of a State or organizational policy or plan. 
The October 8 attack by Nigerian troops 
is reported to have targeted civilians—an 
action that would be encompassed under the 
Rome Statute. Furthermore, the widespread 
reports of disappearances, torture, and 
extra-judicial killings could implicate crim-
inal charges. Nigeria’s denial of enforced 
disappearances also satisfies Article 7(2)
(i)’s requirement of the same. Boko Haram 
has carried out dozens of attacks targeting 
civilians, and there are reports of murder, 
rape, and inhuman acts causing serious 
injury to mental and physical health.
The question remains as to whether 
these reported actions were conducted 
in furtherance of a state or organiza-
tional policy. On November 22, 2012, 
the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
released its annual Report on Preliminary 
Examinations. Preliminary examination, 
as distinct from preliminary investigation, 
is the OTP’s first step of investigating 
situations for possible international crimes 
that could formally be brought before the 
Court. In this report, the OTP found that 
while Nigerian Security Forces’ actions 
may be grave human rights violations, 
there was not a reasonable basis to believe 
that the Nigerian Security Force’s actions 
against Boko Haram were in furtherance of 
a state policy or plan. However, the report 
explicitly stated that this determination 
was subject to change upon new informa-
tion. In contrast, the OTP found that Boko 
Haram does have a stated policy and plan 
of attacking civilians in order to establish 
an Islamic state through Jihad.
As a party to the Rome Statute, Nigeria 
is subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC for 
international crimes committed within its 
territory. The OTP’s report found that there 
is a reasonable basis to believe that Boko 
Haram had committed the crimes against 
humanity of murder and persecution. The 
ICC is a court of last resort to be accessed 
when States Parties will not or cannot 
prosecute those responsible. The OTP will 
next determine whether Nigerian authorities 
are conducting genuine legal proceedings 
against those suspected of responsibility 
for crimes against humanity within Nigeria.
Tyler Addison, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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